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This study looked for evidence of a "credit channel", amplifying monetary impulses transmitted to
the real economy via small manufacturing firms in Japan. It was inspired by several studies that
found evidence of such a "financial accelerator" in the United States. The results are largely
negative, however: There do not appear to be systematic differences in the cyclical response of
small, as compared to large, firms to monetary tightening in Japan.
This leads to a look at differing characteristics of the small-firm sector in the two countries:
Specifically, one of the main reasons for believing that small firms are credit-constrained is that
they tend to be relatively young firms, lacking a track record that helps to overcome informational
asymmetries and to lower the cost of external finance. But, there is some evidence suggesting that
the strong correlation between age and size of firm may not apply in Japan, which has startlingly
low firm turnover rates compared to other industrial countries. The implication is that, while a
credit channel may well exist in Japan, it cannot be identified by using firm size as a proxy for
credit access; more direct measures need to be employed, probably using cross-sectional data. An
appendix to this paper is devoted to data issues relating to the Ministry of Finance's quarterly
survey of corporations, including problems with the size classification based on paid-in capital.
These data problems, while important, do not explain away the lack of evidence for a "credit
channel" through small firms.
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II. Motivation
It is widely believed that overall monetary conditions, and therefore monetary policy, are a
powerful influence on economic activity over the business cycle. At least implicitly, judging from
the lavish attention devoted to central bank actions by the business world and its media, the
proposition that short-term changes in monetary stance affect the economy broadly is accepted
with little question. But there is not a corresponding consensus about how such influence comes
about. Textbook versions of the "channels" of monetary influence that are most popularly
understood – mainly, the Keynesian reasoning that links (long-term real) interest rate levels to
investment in business equipment and housing, and/or monetarist formulations that call for a
stable demand function in measurable forms of "money" – invariably turn out to be unpersuasive
in the concrete. Neither econometric nor common-sense estimates of the interest-sensitivity of
investment, or of money demand, are large enough to explain the powerful cyclical impact that
monetary changes are perceived to have.
This gap has encouraged a revival of interest among economists in alternative formulations, most
notably the so-called "credit channels" of monetary influence that operate through changes in
corporate balance-sheets and/or bank lending behavior. These ideas have a long history – extending
at least back to Irving Fisher's famous 1933 article – and some of their most dramatic development
has been in analyses of the Great Depression of the United States (Mishkin 1978; Bernanke 1983)
that are more than a decade old by now. However, attempts to apply them to more ordinary
business cycle phenomena have become popular mainly in recent years, as economists have
thrown off the yoke of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, positing capital market imperfections that
make it reasonable for balance-sheet structures to influence companies' investment demand and
their access to credit over the monetary policy cycle. Agency costs, arising from asymmetric
information available to borrowers as opposed to lenders, are increased in a period when tight
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monetary conditions cause asset price decline and balance-sheet deterioration at firms. Whether
this is viewed mainly as a change in a bank's propensity to supply credit to firms, or more as a
borrower's diminished eligibility on an unchanged supply schedule, is not critical. In either case, it
constitutes a "financial accelerator" that can magnify the impact of changes in monetary conditions
(and policy) on real economic activity.
The logic points to two main groups of credit-constrained actors – small-sized firms and
households – as the most likely to be affected by monetary policy through such a "balance sheet
channel". These groups are typically more dependent on bank finance, as opposed to open market
capital, and less well collateralized than are large firms. Small firms, in addition, are generally
expected to be younger firms without long track records, adding to information asymmetries
between borrower and lender. Economists in the United States have had some success in
documenting differences, in the behavior of small versus large-sized businesses, that support the
idea that the former are indeed more sensitive to monetary conditions than the latter. Further, the
evidence suggests that the differences are large enough to explain a significant part of cyclical
variation in U.S. aggregate fixed investment, inventory fluctuations, and employment.
If a similar pattern were found for Japan, it would help to explain Japan's experience over the past
decade, which involved some of the largest asset-price swings that any economy has witnessed
since the Great Depression. Further, balance-sheet impacts were concentrated in Japan's small-firm
sector. Japan, like a number of other countries, saw substantial changes in its financial system
during the 1980s, and the coincidence of asset bubbles with trends to more "open" financial
arrangements was observed in most of these countries at this time. A plausible hypothesis, which
is becoming widely accepted at least for the case of Japan, is that a class of firms that had relatively
restricted access to credit before the 1980s became more favored after 1980 – not due solely to
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deregulation and internationalization, but also to accompanying trends that led banks to seek new
clientele to replace cash-rich large firms that were no longer borrowing. The most important such
class might well have been small firms that owned land, and these firms would thus have
experienced especially large expansions in debt, investment, and overall activity during the bubble
and the most stringent cutbacks in the 1990s.1 This mechanism would have amplified the land-
price boom itself, as well as enhancing its impact on credit availability, business capital spending,
and the economy as a whole. The episode can thus be viewed as an exceptionally important case of
financial influences being propagated in amplified fashion through the small firm sector, in a
period when the supply of credit to that sector was shifted disproportionately outward, leading
small firms to rely even more heavily than usual on external credit and to become exceptionally
vulnerable to its withdrawal when monetary conditions tightened in the 1990s.2
III. Empirical verification in other studies
For U.S. firms, a number of studies have found evidence of differing cyclical patterns at small and
large firms, consistent with the notion of a credit channel.3 One of the most comprehensive efforts
is Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), which found significant negative effects of tight money on sales
(used to represent overall activity), inventories and short-term debt at small manufacturing firms,
and did not find them at large firms. The results are clearest in the case of inventory behavior.
Descriptively, inventory growth accelerates just prior to recessions for large firms, but not for
small; and recession-induced inventory declines are sharper for small firms. Similar, but less
pronounced, patterns are found for short-term debt and sales. Structural estimates of investment
                                                
1
 Jeffrey Frankel (19xx) was one of the first to articulate this hypothesis. The Bank of Japan (1996) describes
the episode along these lines.
2
 A similar "story" may be true of households that owned land. But, since the household sector as a whole
divested itself of land holdings during the bubble – making large net sales to the corporate sector – there was
not a major overall deterioration of household balance sheets and this sector thus did not play such a large role
in propagating the asset "bubble" and its aftermath. Bruner and Kamin (1995) detail the household sector's
relatively benign balance-sheet development during the 1980s and 1990s.
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behavior showed significant impact of a cash flow variable (interest coverage ratio) at small firms,
but not at large firms. A subsequent study by the same authors with Bernanke (1994) found
similar results after controlling for industry sector, and after splitting the sample using an
alternative proxy for credit access (bank-dependency instead of size). These studies used data from
the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations, a data set that covers most U.S.
firms and is based on IRS tax returns. A study by Oliner and Rudebush (1996) found greater
sensitivity of fixed investment to internal cash flow at small firms, compared to large ones, using
Compustat data (annual, covering listed firms only).
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) also presented some evidence evaluating the importance of these
differences in the economy's overall response to monetary policy changes. Small manufacturing
firms (classified by gross asset size, with the size criteria adjusted over time so that "small" firms
account for around 30% of sales) contributed 55% to 60% of the drop in total manufacturing sales
within the first 4, 8, or 12 quarters following a monetary tightening, and they offset about 20% of
the inventory accumulation of large firms after 4 quarters, rising to 50% after 8 quarters. The
authors reasoned that the overall cyclical contribution of small firms is likely to be larger than
represented by these estimates, since the weight of small firms is greater outside manufacturing
than within it.
Some studies have found evidence using variables other than size to proxy for credit-
constrainedness. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) showed greater sensitivity of investment to
cash flow and liquidity in firms that retain most of their income. These non-dividend-paying firms
also tended to be smaller and faster growing than others. Richard Cantor (1990) found greater
sensitivity of both fixed investment and employment to cash flow in firms with relatively high
                                                                                                                                                            
Page  6
leverage, which he interpreted as reflecting differences in access to credit. This result is
independent of firm size, but the analysis also found size to have a significant, independent,
negative impact on volatility of investment and employment. A paper by Kashyap, Lamont and
Stein (1994) documented the influence of liquidity (cash plus marketable securities as a share of
total assets) on inventory investment at firms that did not have a bond rating (used as the measure
of "access"), but failed to find the same relationship at bond-rated firms. In Japan, Hoshi, Kashyap
and Scharfstein (1991) used data from the Japan Development Bank on listed firms to show that
liquidity (or cash flow) affects investment at firms that do not have a main bank relationship – a
class of firms that is presumed to be more credit-constrained than others – while no such
relationship was found for main-bank affiliated firms.
IV. Empirical evidence for Japan
A. Sources of data on Japanese corporations
The Ministry of Finance's quarterly survey of corporations (Hojin Kigyo Tokei) covers firms of
all sizes above ¥10 million capital (which, as of April 1996, is now the minimum size of an
incorporated firm in Japan). It includes a broad and consistent set of variables from firms' financial
reports, from 1960 to the present, for several size classes of firm, and is thus a natural place to
look for evidence of size-based differences in response to financial factors. Data by size and by
detailed industry category are also reported, for the most part from 1979 Q4 (Oct-Dec) on. The
survey is virtually a complete census in the category of firms above ¥1 billion in capital, but based
on selected samples for size classes below that.
There are three main problems with this data set. First, the samples are changed once each year,
with the April-June survey. In principle, this should not be a large problem if the samples are
                                                                                                                                                            
3
 For a review of this literature, see, for example, Bernanke (1993), Calomiris (1993) and Hubbard (1994).
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properly selected so as to reflect trends in the population as a whole. However, examination of the
data does suggest that changes in the character of the samples, especially the sample of small
firms, tend to occur with the April sample changeovers (see Appendix C). Two approaches have
been used to minimize this problem: First, the data have been adjusted (more accurately, they have
been smoothed) to distribute changes observed in the annual series more evenly across the
intervening quarters, applying a modified version of the method that was developed by the Institute
for Social Engineering (1976). (See Appendix D.) Secondly, the "small" firm sector used for the
comparisons was limited to firms between ¥100 million and ¥1 billion capital size. This eliminates
the ¥10 million-to-¥100 million size class, which seems to show the greatest instability due to
sampling changes (Appendix C).
A second problem is the method by which the Ministry of Finance estimates population totals in
each size class. These estimates (suikeichi) are what is actually presented in the published data.
They are obtained by multiplying sample statistics for each item by the ratio of the estimated total
population to the size of the sample. Even if the samples are carefully selected, there is likely to be
some bias toward underrepresentation of smaller firms, which means that there may be a bias
toward overestimating the importance of smaller size classes. This problem, however, would not
necessarily affect inferences based on growth rates from period to period. And it certainly should
not affect interpretation of ratios beween different items (including averages per firm) in the
survey, since the latter are essentially sample averages. As one check on whether this problem
might be affecting the results, some comparisons were done with inventory/sales ratios.
The third problem is the size classification itself, which is based on book value of capital. Close to
90% of firms are recorded in the smallest category, of ¥10 million to ¥50 million in capital. (This
observation refers to the underlying population, which is estimated, presumably rather accurately,
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from corporate registry data.) Moreover, the proportion of these smallest firms has actually
increased steadily over time, from around 60% in the early 1960s. This trend seems
counterintuitive given that the size criterion is set in unchanged nominal yen terms over a span of
more than 35 years. As a result, the share of (for one example) sales that is accounted for by large
(over ¥1 billion or over ¥100 million) firms has not grown since the 1960s. This is not due to
changes in sampling procedures: The sample sizes, while they have increased over time, have
grown less than the estimated population, especially in the smallest size classes (Table in Appendix
C). Thus, there is no reason to think that any bias toward overweighting larger firms has been
reduced over time through sample-widening.
One reason for this, at least in the 1990s, is a rise in the minimum capital requirement for
incorporation under Japanese law – from ¥350 thousand to ¥10 million – that was decided in 1990
and became effective in April 1996. This change prompted many very small firms that wished to
remain incorporated to add to their book capital to bring themselves above the ¥10 million
minimum, which happens to coincide with the minimum for inclusion in the MoF quarterly
survey and thus enlarged the number of potential reporters. This has led to an accelerated growth in
the number of firms in the lowest size class that is particularly noticeable starting in 1992
(Appendix C). But, the relatively rapid growth of very small firms had been a fairly consistent
trend for 30 years before that, suggesting that there is more to it than these recent legal changes.
Increases in minimum capital requirements for incorporation, from much lower levels, had
occurred during those years. But these should not have had the same effect on the survey since the
minimum size for inclusion in the MoF survey has always been ¥10 million capital.
The most plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that firms tend to start up with a small
amount of book capital (par value times the number of shares), and often have little incentive to
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increase it even when their assets and economic activity would warrant moving into a "medium"
or "large" size class.4 Indeed, it is possible that the amount of capital that firms report may be
positively related to how recently they were incorporated, rather than to how large they really are. If
this were true, the resulting distortion could be important, as it would run exactly counter to the
expected positive association between age and size of firm that helps to justify using size as a
proxy for credit access.
Even considering the faults in this classification, it seems likely that firms in the largest size class,
reporting more than ¥1 billion in capital, are indeed "large" firms economically speaking. But the
lower size classes should probably be viewed as covering a range that includes both large and
small firms. An optimistic interpretation would be that these samples can still be compared to
reveal differences between larger and smaller firms on average, although the samples might
understate those differences. Ultimately, this assumption has to be believed in order to justfy any
economic interpretation of the MoF data by firm size.
The Bank of Japan's quarterly "Tankan" survey of roughly 5,000 firms also provides data by
size class, based on number of employees. The categories are "small" (50 to 299 employees),
"medium" (300 to 999) and "large" (1000 and above) for manufacturing firms and most
nonmanufacturers. Somewhat smaller levels are used for wholesale and retail trade, including
firms with as few as 20 employees. Classification based on number of employees may not be
ideal, but it is relatively easy to measure, and reasonably consistent in its meaning over time. Data
by size are available for the most part from 1974 on. However, the Tankan survey does not contain
an extensive array of financial data for these firms, limiting its usefulness for present purposes.
                                                
4
 There may be disincentives. For instance, assets transferred from personal to corporate ownership are subject
to capital gains taxation at the time of transfer.
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Still, some comparisons were done using the BoJ data on inventories, sales and borrowing, as one
check to make sure that peculiarities in the MoF survey are not driving the results.
For firms listed on the main stock exchanges, extensive quarterly data are available. The Hoshi,
Kashyap and Scharfstein study cited earlier used the Japan Development Bank's data set for
listed firms which is designed to permit cross-sectional comparisons and allows for following
individual firms over time. However, listed firms  especially in Japan are predominantly larger
firms which by definition have favored access to capital markets, making this source of limited use
for studying the characteristics of small or credit-constrained firms. Indeed, it is striking that the
authors identified only 24 firms (among the continuously listed set that were used for the study)
that did not have a main bank, as compared with 121 firms that did. The findings of the 1991
study are supportive of the credit channels hypothesis, and might be worth updating into the
1990s. But any effort to look at small, as a proxy for credit-constrained, firms necessarily has to
get beyond the set of listed companies alone.
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B. Comparisons of small versus large manufacturing firms in Japan
First, it is necessary to explain why the study focused on manufacturing firms within the Japanese
corporate sector. Clearly, this is not the sector with the most interesting story during the past
"bubble" and its aftermath: Manufacturers took on only 20% of the expansion of corporate
borrowing between 1980 and 1990, even though they had accounted for 36% of oustanding
corporate borrowing in 1980. The remaining 80% of new company borrowing during that decade
was concentrated in wholesale and retail trade (24%), real estate (17%), construction (11%), along
with a variety of other services. Still, the financial characteristics of small firms within the
manufacturing sector are rather different from those of large firms, and their experience in the past
15 years is comparable with that of the nonmanufacturing sector in several ways. On broad
financial measures from the MoF survey (See first table in Appendix A), small manufacturers
have higher debt levels than larger ones, although not as high as small nonmanufacturing firms do.
The importance of land within these companies' balance sheets grew markedly after 1980, as it did
at nonmanufacturing firms but not at large manufacturers. And, the reliance of small
manufacturers on borrowing from financial institutions also rose sharply between 1980 and 1995
to levels quite similar to those of their non-manufacturing counterparts. This is a sharp contrast
with the big reductions in such reliance made by large manufacturers in this period.
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1. Time series comparisons
First, long time series were examined for differences in the cyclical patterns of sales, inventories,
investment, and borrowing at small, as opposed to large, manufacturing firms using the MoF
survey data. “Small” manufacturing firms were defined as those with less than ¥1 billion in
capital, a class that averaged about 44% of total sales through the past past 35 years. However, the
comparisons were done using a subset, excluding firms below ¥100 million in capital because of
the data problems found in that smallest category of firms. While this sacrifices data on an
important set of very small firms, it still should provide evidence of size-based differences in firm
behavior.
The data were first adjusted to smooth over the annual sample changes, using the method that was
developed by the Institute for Social Engineering and is commonly applied by Japanese scholars
using these data (Appendix D). They were then seasonally adjusted using the Census X12 Arima
method, allowing for estimation of seasonals using data for five years before and five years after
each data point. Comparisons were based on quarterly growth rates, except for the inventory sales
ratios which were compared as a check on the potential bias mentioned above (section IV.A.) in
the MoF's method of estimating industry totals from the sample data.
For inventories (Charts - 1 below), small firms seem to have peaked earlier than large firms in
some downturns, but not all. Inventory growth peaked a quarter earlier at small firms in 1974 (Q1
versus Q2), and in 1980 (Q1 versus Q2), and a lot earlier in 1988 (Q1, versus 1989Q3 for large
firms). But large firms peaked first in 1968 (Q4 versus 1969Q2 for small firms), and
simultaneously in 1985 (Q1). When looked at in terms of the level of inventories relative to sales,
small firms peaked first in two of the four cases when a peak can be identified at all (1971Q2,
versus Q3 for large firms; and 1981Q1, versus Q4 for large firms). In 1975, they both peaked in
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Q3, and in the latest cycle large firms peaked earlier: 1992Q4 versus 1993Q1 for small firms.
(Note that inventory growth peaked early at small firms ahead of the latest downturn, but small
firms actually took a bit longer to begin reducing their inventory/sales ratios.) Most importantly,
small firms do see inventory growth ahead of recessions, just as large firms do. And, there is no
particular pattern of their experiencing sharper inventory reductions during downturns: Depending
on the cycle, large firms have made just as rapid, and just as extensive, cutbacks as small firms.
Comparisons of sales and borrowing growth for the two classes of firms were even less
impressive (Charts – 2). Out of 7 identifiable downturns, growth of sales (taken as an indication of
overall activity) peaked at the same time at both groups of firms in five cycles (1969, 1974, 1980,
1987, 1990). The two exceptions (1976 and 1985) were cases when large firms saw a peak one
quarter earlier than small firms. Again, the size of fluctuations is at least as great at large firms as
small ones. The borrowing data depict two occasions (1974 and 1979) when small firms clearly
did cut back sooner than large ones; but the series is too erratic to interpret seriously: containing a
number of extra swings that bear no clear relationship to business cycles.
The results for investment do show somewhat more cyclical fluctuation at small firms (Charts –
2). Indeed, it is only in recent cycles (1986, 1993, 1995) that large firm investment declined, in
nominal yen terms, over any six-month period, whereas small firm investment did so in previous
cycles as well. And, turns have been led by small firms more often that not. Peaks (measured in
growth rates, since levels tend to grow throughout) came first at small firms in three instances
(1969Q1, versus 1969Q2 for large firms; 1973Q4 versus 1974Q1; and 1988Q4 versus 1989Q1),
simultaneously in one (1979Q3), and earlier at large firms in one (1984Q3, as opposed to 1984Q4
at small firms). Small firms led investment upturns by more: troughing in 1971Q4, versus
1972Q3 at large firms; 1974Q4, versus 1975Q1; 1977Q3 versus 1978Q3; and 1982Q1 versus
1983Q1. Troughs were simultaneous in 1986Q1, and large firms bottomed first in 1993Q3
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(versus 1993Q4 at small firms). This unusual lag in small firm investment recovery has been a
much-noted feature of the current "post-bubble" recovery. It should be noted that the symmetry of
differential behavior at both peaks and troughs, while it is conventional wisdom for Japan, is not
necessarily predicted by theory (see Bernanke and Gertler (1989)), and is not what has been found
in the United States. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) based some of their results on the hypothesis,
which is maintained in their U.S. data, that balance sheet effects operate asymmetrically to create a
difference between small and large firms in downturns, but not upturns. Finally, the investment
data from the MoF survey showed three extra downturns at small firms that were not seen at large
ones (peaks in 1976Q2, 1982Q2 and 1993Q2). This may indicate data problems, or it may
document higher volatility in some sense – but it is not clear that this is a cyclical fluctuation
pattern that verifies the credit channel hypothesis for small firms.
     
A look at the BoJ's Tankan survey data indicates that this lack of differentiation between small and
large firms is not simply a fault of the size classification in the MoF data. For inventory growth,
for instance, smaller firms, classified by number of employees, show no tendency to earlier or
sharper cutbacks during downturns compared to large firms. Inventory/sales ratios, if anything,
showed milder fluctuations at small firms in downturns (Charts – 3). Cyclical fluctuation in sales
is basically similar in all three size classes, consistent with the MoF data. Borrowing from financial
institutions does seem to show a regular cyclical pattern at small firms in the Tankan data, much
more than at large ones. But reductions are not more severe during downturns, as would be
expected if monetary tightening had a bigger impact on small firm balance sheets. Indeed, the BoJ
data show virtually no instances of outright decline in borrowing by smaller firms, even during
recessions (Charts – 4).
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2. Comparisons of cumulative change after monetary tightenings
A second set of descriptive comparisons was based on cumulative changes in the same variables,
in periods following the start of monetary tightenings. The definition of a "tightening period" was
based on the trend in the overnight call money rate, after examination of several alternative
measures of "monetary tightening" (See Appendix B). The precise timing of onset for both
tightenings and easings does vary depending on which measure is used: that is, whether interest
rates alone are used, or they are combined with exchange rates in a "Bank of Canada-style" index
of overall monetary conditions, and whether nominal or real (inflation-adjusted) measures are used
for both interest and exchange rates. For a period this long, it seems best to use the simplest
measure of tightening, based on the timing of sustained rises in nominal short-term interest rates.
A broader, and inflation-adjusted, measure is undoubtedly preferable for more current analysis,
and it gives a stronger picture of the extent of changes in some periods – most notably, the most
recent easing of monetary policy since early 1995. But it becomes difficult to interpret these
measures in a time span that includes two externally-imposed "oil shocks" and major changes in
exchange-rate regime. Also, the nominal overnight interest rate measure is appealing because it
shows the clearest cyclical changes throughout the period covered. On this measure, there were
five periods of tightening that could be documented using the MoF survey data: starting in May
1967, November 1972, February 1979, August 1985 and March 1989 (Appendix B). Of these, the
last three tightening periods could be examined using the Tankan data by employment size.
The gist of the results can be seen in Charts 5-9 below. There are no consistent differences between
small and large firms across these cycles. Both large and small firms experienced inventory
growth well into tightening periods, followed by a period of flat (in the earlier "growth-recession"
cycles) or negative (in the later ones) growth. Cumulative inventory growth does seem to have
been curbed at a lower level at small firms. The exception was the episode that began in mid-1985;
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in that case inventories fell from the start – but less so at small firms than at large ones.
Inventory/sales ratios generally were restrained about as much at large as at small firms,
reflecting the fact that small firms' sales growth was more muted during these downturns than that
of large firms. The comparisons are similar, whether viewed in the MoF or the BoJ data,
indicating that they are not driven by the method of size classification or other peculiarities of
sampling. An exception here is the data on borrowing, especially in the most recent cycle. Of the
two, the BoJ data seem to follow a more plausible pattern, which is a bit of a disappointment given
that the strength of the MoF survey is supposed to be its coverage of financial variables.
Investment does show one differential pattern by size that is common to all cycles before 1985,
but it is not one predicted by the financial accelerator. That is: The impact of tightening appears to
be initially greater at large firms, which experienced a relative slowing of investment growth (none
of these cycles had outright declines) in the first two years starting 1968Q1, 1972Q4 and 1979Q1.
Later on, smaller firms are more affected, so that over a period of 4 or 5 years their investment
growth falls behind that of larger firms after tightening. The cycle that started in 1985Q3 shows no
clear difference between large and small firms, and in the most recent one small firms' investment
was weaker from the start (Charts 7). This last is an oft-noted observation on the post-bubble
downturn; it is consistent with a credit channel, and with the Frankel/BoJ version in particular. But
it appears to be something new.
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3. VAR analysis
As could be expected based on the negative results of these descriptive comparisons, vector
autoregression analysis also did not turn up any convincing evidence that small firms are subject to
greater impacts from monetary tightening than are large firms. These experiments used a direct
measure of "monetary conditions" as one of the endogenous variables in various equations, which
allowed experimentation with alternative measures of monetary conditions  based on real interest
rates, and on a combination of exchange rates along with interest rates  as well as the measure
based on nominal interest rates alone (See Appendix B on measures of monetary tightness). Some
estimates were done using a dummy variable for the start of tightening periods, an approach that is
comparable with the descriptive comparisons in Section IV.B.2. above; these showed no
significant effects from the monetary variables on either class of firm. For small firms, the only
cases where the four lagged values of a monetary conditions variable contributed, independently of
sales, were in explaining changes in small-firm borrowing: Here, the real interest rate was
signficant at a 10% level of probability and real overall monetary conditions at a 5% level.
However, none of the measures helped to explain investment at small firms (or at large ones
either). For inventories, one variable – the nominal monetary conditions index – contributed
significantly at the 10% level in the case of large firms, but not at small ones. (Results summarized
in Appendix A, Table 2)
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V. Why are the results different for Japan?
The data available for comparing small versus large firms contain serious problems, as discussed
above and detailed further in Appendix C. For instance, the firms classified as having less than ¥1
billion capital in the Ministry of Finance corporate survey may not really be proponderantly
"small", given the lack of incentives for increasing paid-in capital as firms grow over time. Since
this is the most detailed source of financial data by firm size, lack of faith in its size classification
impairs almost any effort to do comparative time-series analysis of firm behavior. Still, this
problem does not affect the Bank of Japan's more limited data from its quarterly Tankan survey.
And, in cases where Tankan data could be examined, they showed no more of the distinct small-
firm cyclical patterns that were found in U.S. firms that the MoF survey did. This makes it hard to
put down the lack of results to faulty data alone.
A. Correlation of firm size and "age"
An alternative interpretation would be that firm size does not accurately represent the salient aspect
of "credit channel" theory in Japan, as it seems to do in the United States. The notion that small
firms are exceptionally vulnerable to the impact of higher agency costs during periods of tight
monetary conditions stems from the expectation that information asymmetries are particularly high
in the case of small firms. And one of the main reasons for that expectation is that smaller firms
are often younger firms lacking a history on which external lenders can base a credit judgment.
The positive correlation between age and size of firms is generally assumed rather than
documented, but there is some circumstantial evidence suggesting that it may be less true in Japan
than in other industrial countries.
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Certainly, it is overwhelmingly plausible that new firms tend to be very small, and this has been
documented in Japan and other countries.5 But the degree to which this is reflected in a younger
average age of small firms depends, as well, on the frequency with which firms are created and
dissolved. In this respect, the data suggest that Japan may be quite different from other industrial
countries that have been surveyed. Table 1 below presents some comparisons that have been
compiled by the OECD and by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Both "birth"
and "death" of establishments (or of firms, in some cases as noted in the table) are defined to
exclude (as far as data sources allow) takeovers, and also shifting of existing businesses to a new
location or industry.
                                                
5
 The OECD's    Employment Outlook   for 1994 found an average size of less than 5 employees for new firms in
each of 7 countries surveyed, which without exception was a fraction of the average size of all firms (p. 120).
In Japan, the Kokuminkinyukoko's annual survey shows the same thing, at least for the subset of its own client
companies: In 1994 the average size was 3.7 for newly established companies; 93% of the total having fewer
than 10 employees and 92% having less than ¥50 million in capital.
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Table 1
Birth and death rates of firms
OECD comparisons:
Establishments*:
Newly opened Closed Years covered
Canada ** 19.1 16.3 1984-91
Sweden 16.8 14.6 1987-92
France 14.3 13.2 1984-92
Denmark 14.2 13.6 1984-89
New Zealand 13.7 14.5 1987-92
United States 13.6 9.2 1984-91
Italy** 11.8 9.9 1984-92
Finland 11.2 9.8 1986-91
United Kingdom** 9.2 8.5 1987-91
MITI comparison:
United States** 13.8 11.9 1983-94
Japan 4.4 4.3 1981-94
*  Average annual rates of new establishments during each year, and closings during each year, as a percent of
the number of firms at the beginning of the period.
** Data are for firms, rather than establishments.
Sources: OECD    Employment Outlook   , July 1994, p. 117;
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Small and Medium Enterprise Agency,      White Paper on Small and
    Medium-sized Enterprise   , 1996, p. 332, and mimeo update. (Original data from Somusho,    Statistics of
   Establishments.)
U.S. Small Business Administration,    The State of Small Business: A Report of the President  , 1994. (Original
data from state unemployment offices.)
These data are fraught with difficulties and problems of comparison, and the OECD's survey did
not include Japan at all.6 However, the fact that the MITI's comparison found broadly the same
birth and death rates for the United States as the OECD's did suggests that the stark difference
between Japan and the United States may indeed be real.7 And, since the OECD survey indicates
that the turnover rate in the United States is far from exceptionally high, it appears to be Japan that
is the outlier here. The lowest birth and death rates in the OECD survey, those for the United
                                                
6
 The OECD (1994) describes these problems in some detail; see especially p. 108.
7
 The MITI used data from the U.S. Small Business Association (1994), which in turn are taken from state
unemployment offices, and appear to be conceptually similar to those used by the OECD. For Japanese firms,
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Kingdom, are still twice those for Japan. This, on the face of it, would suggest that the age (in the
sense of years since start-up) distribution of small firms is not as comparatively "young" in Japan
as it would be in countries with higher turnover rates.
B. Balance sheet characteristics of small firms
The second reason for believing that smaller firms are more credit-constrained is their lack of
assets that can be used as collateral against loans from outside parties. Collateralizable assets are
those whose value can be readily verified, and whose control can be shifted from one owner to
another: Primarily, this means they are fixed assets, as opposed to human capital. Data from the
MoF survey do show clearly that large firms have much larger fixed assets, relative to the level of
liabilities that they have to support, than small firms do (Table 2). The ratios have changed over the
years, but not the difference between large and small firms.
However, if one looks at assets in the form of land, alone, the comparison turns out quite
differently. Small firms, on average, have significantly more of this particular type of collateral
(relative to their total balance sheets) than large firms do. To be sure, land represents only about
one-quarter of corporate fixed assets (one-third at small firms alone). But if it is true, as often
stated, that Japanese lenders have traditionally shown a strong preference for land relative to other
types of collateral, it could be that small firms – as a class – are not as disadvantaged on this
ground, either, as is usually assumed. It is difficult to judge the importance of this point without
comparative data for the United States. But, at a minimum, it suggests that one needs to look at
differences across small firms based on their balance sheet characteristics, rather than using size
alone as a proxy for credit constraints.
                                                                                                                                                            
the MITI used data from the Management and Coordination Agency's    Statistics on Establishments   .
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In terms of bank dependence, the figures in Appendix A show that small firms indeed have higher
ratios of borrowing from financial institutions to total debt, compared to larger firms. However the
gap appears to be of recent origin. In 1980, the ratios were little different – actually slightly higher
at large firms than at small ones. This is true for both all-industry averages and for manufacturing
firms alone. However the gap between size classes in the 1990s is even greater in manufacturing,
since bank-dependence of large firms has fallen much more sharply among manufacturing firms
than in non-manufacturing. Small firms in both sets of industries, in contrast, have increased their
reliance on financial institution borrowing to about one-half their total debt, compared with only
38% in 1980. This may be a clue that balance sheet differences have changed a good deal over the
years, and that comparative cyclical relationships may have changed as well. It is consistent with
the idea that a credit channel through small firms could  have become important in the most recent




Collateral, by firm size
As % of total liabilities:
Industry Fixed assets
Dec-80 Dec-85 Dec-90 Dec-95
All (incl mining,ag,etc) 41.6 48.4 49.2 58.5
All, large firms (over ¥1 bil
capital)
48.5 59.5 59.7 73.0
All ind., small firms (below ¥1 bil) 35.3 38.8 40.6 48.5
Manufacturing 44.0 51.3 58.2 67.0
Mfg, large firms 47.1 55.5 65.3 78.8
Mfg, small firms 38.8 45.0 48.4 53.4
Land assets
Dec-80 Dec-85 Dec-90 Dec-95
All (incl mining,ag,etc) 7.0 8.4 10.3 14.1
All, large firms 4.9 6.1 7.3 11.2
All ind., small firms 8.9 10.3 12.8 16.1
Manufacturing 6.1 8.1 9.3 12.6
Mfg, large firms 5.1 6.2 7.7 10.6
Mfg, small firms 7.9 10.8 11.5 14.8
Fixed assets other than land
Dec-80 Dec-85 Dec-90 Dec-95
All (incl mining,ag,etc) 34.6 40.0 38.9 44.4
All, large firms 43.6 53.4 52.4 61.8
All ind., small firms 26.4 28.5 27.8 32.4
Manufacturing 37.8 43.2 48.9 54.5
Mfg, large firms 42.0 49.3 57.6 68.2
Mfg, small firms 31.0 34.3 36.9 38.6
All items are industry averages, based on aggregate values in nominal yen
Source: MoF Quarterly Survey of Corporations
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C. Role of subsidized credit institutions for small business
Another possible source of difference could be the counter-cyclical contribution made by Japan's
specialized financial institutions serving small business. These institutions offer subsidized credit
to small firms as part of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program – one of whose prime
justifications has long been precisely the belief that small firms suffer disproportionately in
downturns because of their weak access to private credit. These institutions do provide a
significant, even if declining, share of lending to very small businesses, judging from data
provided in the MITI White Papers (charts below). It is less clear, though, that they offer a
counter-cyclical cushion large enough to free small firms from what would otherwise be a major
disadvantage in downturns.
There are a number of problems in interpreting these data. The criterion for defining "small"
enterprises in bank lending data has changed over the years, and this caused a particularly large
break in the series around 1977-78. In these data, "small" is currently defined to include firms with
less than ¥100 million or fewer than 300 employees, and used even lower cutoffs in previous
decades. Differences in coverage impair comparison with the MoF corporate data, for two reasons.
The MoF's quarterly survey, the one that has a sufficient history to be useful here, includes only
firms above ¥10 million in capital. The annual survey includes even smaller firms (above ¥1
million capital), but these data are available only from 1980 on. The difference in coverage leads to
a much higher level of reported borrowing for firms below ¥100 million in the annual survey, by
an average of about 75% in the 1980s and about 50% in the first half of the 1990s. Further, the
bank lending data include an unknown amount of lending to unincorporated firms. This relative
under-coverage of small firms in the MoF quarterly data accounts (at least, in part) for the fact that
total lending to small firms reported by banks was several times larger than total borrowing of
small firms in the MoF survey during much of the 1960s and 1970s, and remains 60% to 80%
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larger in the 1990s. These data cannot, therefore, be used to estimate the actual share of specific
lending institutions in total borrowing by small firms.
Hoping, though, that these distortions in the level of the ratio may not completely invalidate the
cyclical relationships found, the figures below trace shares and changes of lending by specialized
institutions compared to total lending and/or reported borrowing. There seems to be some
tendency for that share to increase in downturns (except for 1985). But this would be true even if
government institutions' lending remained constant over the business cycle. It makes more sense
to look at whether fluctuations in net new borrowing cushion the cycle. Net changes in
outstandings were used as a measure of this, and they show no persuasive evidence of offsetting
behavior (charts below). Indeed, the correlation between private and subsidized institutions' net
lending to small business was a positive .45 over the entire period 1960 to 1994.
Page  26
VI. Conclusions
In any country, the "venture capital" model of a small firm, destined to either fail or to become
large in future years, is unlikely to be the only one that is important. Some smaller firms are
essentially sub-contractors to one or more large firms, very likely relying on these larger firms
directly, or as guarantors, for access to external finance, and these may remain small indefinitely.
Another model might be firms that are spun off from the "down-sizing" of large firms, employing
long-service workers at reduced cost by taking them out of the seniority-dependent pay
progression. (The MITI's White Paper presents some evidence that the average age of managers at
small firms has been rising faster than that at large firms over the past 15 years or so.) Probably all
of these models have some applicability in every modern economy, but the relative weight of
different types of small firms may not be the same. Certainly, the conventional wisdom in Japan
would hold that the first, "venture capital" model of small firms is much less important, and the
others more so, in Japan compared to other countries.
Whether for this or other reasons, comparing aggregate time series data for small versus large
firms does not produce the kind of differences, evidencing a "credit channel", in Japan that were
found in the United States. This does not mean that credit channels are not important in amplifying
impacts of changes in monetary conditions, but that the set of actors through which the channel
works are not identified by firm size alone. The Frankel/Bank of Japan "story" – a "credit channel"
story focused on a part of the small firm sector – remains the most plausible explanation of what
happened over the past 15 years in Japan. But demonstrating this probably requires a cross-
sectional analysis, one that can identify other features of individual firms more salient than size.
Primary among these might be balance sheet characteristics, including ownership of land.
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Total inventories (MoF corporate survey data, sa)
Firms with ¥100 mil - ¥1 bil capital
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Inventory/sales ratio (MoF corporate survey data, sa)2 qtr avg of %q/q
Notes:
Outstanding inventories ("tanaoroshi" total) and borrowing at end-quarter; sales during quarter, as reported in the MoF
survey of corporations.
Data have been adjusted to smooth annual variations due to April sample change (see Appendix D).
Seasonal adjustment done with Census X12 Arima method (using 5 year's data before and 5 years after each data point).
Shaded areas represent periods of monetary tightening (see Appendix B)
Charts – 2  Time series data from the MoF survey of corporations, continued
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Investment (MoF corporate survey data, sa)2 qtr avg of %q/q
See notes to Charts 1.
Investment series constructed from MoF survey data as follows:
Total investment =business fixed investment + land investment + inventory investment
  Business fixed investment = changes in value of tangible fixed assets (excluding land) + depreciation allowances
  Land investment = changes in value of land as assets
  Inventory investment = changes in value of inventories
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Inventory/sales ratio (BoJ Tankan survey, sa)ratio
Large firms (1000+ )
Small firms (50-299 employees)
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Sales (BoJ Tankan survey, sa)2 qtr avg of %q/q
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Borrowing from financial institutions (BoJ Tankan survey, sa)2 qtr avg of %q/q
Large firms (1000+ )
Small firms (50-299 employees)
Medium-sized firms (300-999)
Notes to Charts 3 and 4.: Seasonally adjusted data from BoJ Tankan source.
Shaded areas represent periods of monetary tightening (see Appendix B)
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Charts – 7  Cumulative percentage changes from the MoF survey –  continued
Investment
Notes to Charts 5 - 7:
Data definitions and sources, same as Charts 1 and 2.
Indexes based on the average for the quarter during which monetary tightening began.
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Charts – 9  Cumulative percentage changes from the BoJ Tankan survey, continued
Sales and borrowing
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Index, 1989Q1 = 100
Notes to Charts 7 and 8:
Data definitions and sources, same as Charts 3 and 4.
Indexes based on the average for the quarter during which monetary tightening began.
Series break at 1977-78 in first chart reflects a change in the criteria used to define "small" business loans of private
institutions.
Specialized government institutions for small business lending are: Chusho kigyo kinyu kok, kokumin kinyu koko,
Kankyo kaisei kinyu koko.
"Share" in first chart = lending by specialized government institutions as % of total by all financial institutions, to small
firms defined as: Capital below ¥10 mil before 1963; below ¥50 mil until 1972; below ¥100 mil 1973-76; below ¥100
mil and fewer than 300 employees from 1977.
"Share" in second chart = lending by specialized institutions, as shown by MITI, as % of total borrowing from financial
institutions reproted in MoF Quarterly survey for firms below ¥100 mil. Note that this ratio is overstated for at least tow
reasons, as noted in the text: The MoF quarterly data include only firms with ¥10 million capital or more, and do not
include unincorporated enterprises.The dotted line in the second chart, based on the fuller annual MoF survey available
from 1980 on, gives an indication of the size of the first problem, but does not correct for the second.
Shaded areas are years in which EPA-dated downturns occurred.
Net lending or borrowing = change in outstandings.
Sources: MITI White Paper on Small Enterprise, various years (original data from BoJ annuals and other sources); MoF
Quarterly Survey of Corporations.
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Appendix A: Firm characteristics by size and industry 
Source: MoF quarterly survey of corporations
Debt as % of fixed assets: Land as % of fixed assets: Borrowing from financial 
 institutions as % of debt:
end-year levels 1980 1985 1990 1995 1980 1985 1990 1995 1980 1985 1990 1995
All industries* 240 207 203 171 17 17 21 24 40 44 45 46
  Large firms** 206 168 167 137 10 10 12 15 42 43 39 38
  Small firms 283 258 246 206 25 27 32 33 38 45 50 51
Manufacturing 227 195 172 149 14 16 16 19 40 40 34 39
  Large firms 212 180 153 127 11 11 12 13 41 38 26 29
  Small firms 257 222 207 187 20 24 24 28 38 43 45 50
Food 203 183 160 137 18 20 19 22 40 41 39 47
Textiles  267 221 196 176 14 14 15 22 46 51 48 52
Clothing,textile pdts 341 332 224 214 26 26 35 27 38 37 47 51
Lumber,wood pdts 302 258 221 219 31 38 29 35 41 45 42 51
Paper pulp  194 181 148 139 13 15 13 16 46 49 46 48
Printing, publishing 185 163 156 157 18 26 23 24 35 34 38 42
Chemicals  206 180 156 135 13 14 14 16 41 40 31 36
Petroleum, coal pdts  370 303 233 149 15 20 25 25 60 56 52 49
Ceramic products 204 177 158 153 16 18 20 24 42 45 38 46
Steel  176 173 155 133 10 11 13 15 44 49 33 41
Nonferrous metals 248 223 177 139 11 12 15 15 49 53 37 51
Precious metals 243 218 189 176 20 24 23 25 37 46 41 48
General machinery 277 230 217 175 18 17 18 25 34 36 33 43
Electrical machinery 229 190 169 154 9 10 10 11 26 25 21 25
Transport machinery 158 131 132 103 13 12 13 14 25 28 25 30
Precision machinery 221 171 182 153 11 13 16 18 27 33 34 35
Shipbuilding 438 416 358 291 15 16 19 18 40 42 27 26
Other manufacturing 257 220 188 154 19 25 20 23 36 40 39 36
Non-manufacturing 248 213 218 180 19 18 23 26 40 46 49 48
  Large firms 201 160 176 143 10 10 13 16 42 47 45 43
  Small firms 294 273 259 211 27 28 34 35 38 46 51 51
Wholesale & retail trade 416 357 312 247 23 25 25 29 36 40 38 42
  Wholesale 532 455 399 325 25 27 25 28 34 37 34 38
  Retail 200 191 188 164 21 23 26 29 45 49 49 26
Real estate 213 203 226 173 32 33 41 44 52 64 71 65
Transport & commun. 143 110 105 103 15 12 15 22 53 44 43 41
  Land transport 144 141 108 105 21 23 22 30 57 56 44 37
  Marine transport 150 127 133 127 4 3 7 9 55 68 64 65
  Other transport & comm. 134 86 97 95 16 8 9 13 43 20 35 41
Electric utilities 95 91 88 89 3 3 4 4 46 53 49 43
Gas,water 102 90 82 85 8 9 11 12 53 57 40 37
Other services 152 171 194 153 20 18 20 19 46 61 64 60
  Business services 187 222 238 181 4 4 12 8 59 73 78 71
  Lodging 115 128 117 129 13 16 15 23 69 73 70 67
  Personal services 177 139 158 162 21 30 18 31 17 19 44 42
  Entertainment 130 125 142 128 38 34 33 27 31 36 48 44
  Broadcasting 102 100 85 89 20 19 20 19 32 33 30 46
  Other services 175 195 261 158 18 28 25 30 22 47 35 49
Construction  501 471 410 322 26 29 36 34 30 35 32 37
*   Includes mining, agriculture, etc., which are not shown above and account for between 1% and 2% of firms, employees, sales, or debt.
** Firms with more than ¥1 billion capital
Source: Ministry of Finance, Quarterly Survey of Corporations
Appendix A: Table 2
Results of VAR estimations
F-test for joint contribution to explaining variance of inventories, borrowing or investment, based on
comparison of VAR estimation with four lags of restricted form including sales only, and unrestricted
form including sales and one of the five measures of monetary conditions:
Dependent variable Monetary conditions measure Sample period F value  Degrees  of
  freedom
Small firms'
Inventories Dummy (start of tightening) 1968.3 - 1995.2  1.62 4,95
Call money rate " 1.52 "
Real call money rate " 0.90 "
Nominal monetary conditions index  1971.1-95.2 0.22 4,85
Real monetary conditions index " 1.03
Investment Dummy (start of tightening) 1971.3 - 1995.2  1.66 4,85
Call money rate " 0.45 "
Real call money rate " 0.46 "
Nominal monetary conditions index   " 0.41 "
Real monetary conditions index " 0.38 "
Borrowing Dummy (start of tightening) 1971.3 - 1995.2  0.21 4,85
Call money rate " 0.73 "
Real call money rate " 2.03* "
Nominal monetary conditions index   " 0.80 "
Real monetary conditions index " 3.62** "
Large firms'
Inventories Dummy (start of tightening) 1968.3 - 1995.2  0.23 4,95
Call money rate " 1.61 "
Real call money rate " 0.64 "
Nominal monetary conditions index  1971.1-95.2 2.16* 4,85
Real monetary conditions index " 0.995
Investment Dummy (start of tightening) 1971.3 - 1995.2  1.59 4,85
Call money rate " 0.16 "
Real call money rate " 0.45 "
Nominal monetary conditions index   " 1.18 "
Real monetary conditions index " 0.53 "
Borrowing Dummy (start of tightening) 1971.3 - 1995.2  0.74 4,85
Call money rate " 0.37 "
Real call money rate " 1.53 "
Nominal monetary conditions index   " 1.82 "
Real monetary conditions index " 1.59 "
*   Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
Appendix B: Measures of monetary conditions
The timing of periods of monetary tightening is basically similar, whether measured using the
interest rate alone or by an index that reflects exchange rates. The extent of change in monetary
conditions does change – most strikingly in the recent period of easing that began in 1995. In prin-
ciple, the deflated measures should be more meaningful (and they probably are when used for more
current analysis), but for a period this long, including the 1970s oil shocks, the meaning of real
interest rates becomes harder to interpret.
In the descriptive analysis above, dating of periods of tightening was based on the nominal interest
rate alone. VAR experiments were done using quarterly versions of all four measures.
Monthly averages:
* An outlier observation (21%) for March 1961 was omitted
from the charts. This period was not in any of the data
comparisons anyway.
Note:  Shading depicts official EPA recession periods, peak to trough
Overnight interest rate: Uncollateralized call money*
Inflation rate: Year-on-year % change in nationwide CPI for all items (Quarterly measure was deflated using the GDP
deflator)
Index = weighted average of interest rate and effective exchange rate, the latter measured as a deviation from the 1970-
1995 trend (1990=100). Weights based on exports/GNP ratio for each quarter.
Effective exchange rate: J.P. Morgan index against 15 industrial country currencies; real measure deflated by manufac-
turing prices in each country
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Appendix C: Data issues
I. Over- or under-representation of smaller firms?
As noted in Section IV.A of the text, one of the first things that stands out in the Ministry of Finance
quarterly data is that the share of smaller firms in estimated total corporate sales appears to increase
over time, despite the fact that these size levels are set in unchanged nominal yen terms over 35
years. The chart below is illustrative, and basically similar pictures could be painted using other
variables such as investment or inventory levels.
The estimates, as noted in Section IV.A, are made using an approach that may tend to exaggerate the
importance of lower size groups. This is because they assume the sample average is representative of
the entire population of corporations, but sampled firms are likely to be biased toward being larger
than average. However, there is no obvious reason why this bias would have increased over time.
Source: All data in this appendix are from the MoF Survey of corporations, Fiscal year data, unless noted
otherwise.
In principle, the bias could increase over time if there were a tendency for the samples to be broad-
ened, bringing in a larger component of smaller firms as time went on. However this does not seem
to be the case. As can be seen in the table below, the size of samples (except for the largest size class,
which is actually a census, not a sample) has been kept broadly unchanged since 1980. As a result,
the share of small or medium-sized firms actually included in the samples has gone down, not up.
Note that there has been an accelerated trend toward a larger number of small firms in recent years,
which can be attributed to the legal change raising the minimum capital required for incorporation to
¥10 million, a level that happens to be the same as the minimum size included in the MoF survey. As
can be seen in the table, the number of firms in the smallest category shown (those between ¥10
million and ¥100 million capital) almost doubled between 1990, when the change was announced,
and 1996 when it became effective. A 19% increase occurred just in the last year before the new
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Source: MoF Quarterly Survey of Corporations, various issues
Appendix C-2
 
(Corporations with more than ¥10 million capital, all industries)
Oct-Dec 1980 survey
¥10 mil to ¥100 mil ¥100 mil to ¥1 bil Above ¥1 bil  
Population 236927 13071 2020 252018
Sample 13364 6487 2020 21871
Respondents 10826 5804 2019 18649
%:
Response rate 81.0 89.5 100.0 85.3
Coverage of est. 4.6 44.4 100.0 7.4
population
Oct-Dec 1985 survey
¥10 mil to ¥100 mil ¥100 mil to ¥1 bil Above ¥1 bil  
Population 316824 15089 2584 334497
Sample 7587 6436 2584 16607
Respondents 6039 5794 2584 14417
%:
Response rate 79.6 90.0 100.0 86.8
Coverage of est. 1.9 38.4 100.0 4.3
population
Oct-Dec 1990 survey
¥10 mil to ¥100 mil ¥100 mil to ¥1 bil Above ¥1 bil  
Population 406619 19995 3746 430360
Sample 9098 8292 3746  
Respondents 6906 7145 3746 17797
%:
Response rate 75.9 86.2 100.0 84.2
Coverage of est. 1.7 35.7 100.0 4.1
population
Oct-Dec 1995 survey
¥10 mil to ¥100 mil ¥100 mil to ¥1 bil Above ¥1 bil  
Population 681600 24065 4884 710549
Sample  10157 4884 24252
Respondents 6817 8647 4874 20338
%:
Response rate 74.0 85.1 99.8 83.9
Coverage of est. 1.0 35.9 99.8 2.9
population
April-June 1996 survey
¥10 mil to ¥100 mil ¥100 mil to ¥1 bil Above ¥1 bil  
Population 809590 24644 5081 839315
Sample 9381 9126 5081 23588
Respondents  7570 5023 19304
%:
Response rate 71.5 82.9 98.9 81.8
Coverage of est. 0.8 30.7 98.9 2.3
population
A similar tendency is seen within the manufacturing sector, although it is not quite as dramatic. The
share of sales accounted for by large, as opposed to small, manufacturing firms has remained broadly
unchanged since 1970s – and before that, the weight of small firms actually grew. Again, this seems
counterintuitive with a size break set in nominal yen.
Average sales per firm within each size class has grown markedly over time (although not during the
1990s recession), as might be expected. The exception is the smallest category, of firms below ¥50
million, which have not increased very much in average size (Charts on next page).  Similar observa-
tions can be made for capital, investment and inventories in manufacturing.
Breaking this observation into its two components – the number of firms and average sales per firm
– shows that the phenomenon is due to disproportionate growth in the number of firms in the very
smallest size category. In fact, firms with less than ¥50 million capital account for almost all of the
increase and came up to 87% of all firms by 1995. As noted above for all firms, the growth in this
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The MoF survey shows the average number of employees per firm declining steadily over time; the
decline being especially sharp during the 1960s and early 1970s. The same pattern holds for manu-
facturing firms within the MoF survey (charts below).
Some of these characteristics can be checked against the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry's data on industrial firms. Generally, these comparisons support the idea that the MoF data
are accurate in showing a decline of average firm size over time.
Employment: Data are not completely comparable, because the MITI survey covers establishments
rather than firms, and the series used here are limited to establishments with 30 or more employees.
The establishment data show more cyclical ups and downs, as might be expected, but they do show
the same broad downward trend in average size, which was especially pronounced before 1975.
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Total number of firms: Size trends for establishments differ from what the MoF survey shows for
firms, which may not be unreasonable. MITI data show big declines during the “restructuring”
periods of the 1970s and the 1990s. Note that the first “restructuring” period was accompanied by
significant decline in firm size, measured by employees, while the second one seems to have seen a
moderate increase. (Note that the MITI survey is a census, not a sample as the MoF survey is, but
these data cover only establishments with 30 or more employees so that the number is much smaller
than the estimated number of firms in MoF data.)
Sales per firm: Shipments data from the MITI survey show a similar  pattern to sales in the MoF
survey (second chart on next page). The exception is in the 1990s, when average sales per firm show
a steep decline, while shipments per establishment do not. Part of the difference could be deflation in
prices of manufactured goods, since the shipments data are in volume terms. Average levels of
investment and inventories show similar patterns in both sets of data (not shown).
II. Volatility in the small-manufacturing sector
The behavior of small manufacturing firms looks considerably different, in the MoF survey data,
depending on whether the smallest capital-size classes are included or not. Charts below illustrate
this for two variables, sales and inventories, by splitting series for all firms below ¥1 billion into
those for firms between ¥100 million and ¥1 billion only, and those for firms between ¥10 million
and ¥100 million. The latter category, of very small firms (measured by capital), accounts for most
of total activity, as already observed. But it accounts for an even larger share of short-term varia-
Source: All data in this section on small manufacturers are from the MoF quarterly survey of corporations, and are
adjusted for sample change (see Appendix D), but not for seasonality.
Appendix C-5











60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Total inventories, small manufacturing firms¥ trillion
All firms under ¥1 billion capital
¥100 m to ¥1 bil












60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Total inventories, small manufacturing firms%oya
All firms under ¥1 bil capital
¥100 m to ¥1 b







69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93







69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93
Average shipments per establishment¥ million
tions. Viewed in year-on-year changes, it is particularly noticable in the past few years that fluctua-
tions at the smallest firms have followed idiosynchratic patterns. Indeed, the sharp ups and downs in
1995 occurred only in the below-¥100 million class, disappearing altogether when series for ¥100 to
¥1 billion is used. (Similar discrepancies appear in the borrowing data, not shown here.)
This recent instability may be related to the rapid expansion of the smallest size class due to the legal
change discussed above. If so, it could be a temporary problem that will disappear over time. For
present purposes, it was deemed sufficient reason to limit the "small" size class used in comparisons
to include only firms with over ¥100 million capital. However, it has to be admitted that this sacri-
fices a considerable amount of information, given the importance of these smallest firms.
III. Sample instability: Observations on the business services sector
The business services sector (which means firms supplying services to businesses) was initially
selected for study because it is reasonably large and showed some of the classic patterns of the
bubble and post-bubble period.
Business services firms made up about 7.5% of employment and 6% of total debt (as estimated in
the MoF survey) in 1995. But they accounted for almost 12% of debt growth in the 1980s (whether
measured for the whole decade or the second half only), and experienced a sharp debt contraction
between 1990 and 1995 (enough to contribute a negative 4 percentage points to total corporate debt
growth). Debt to fixed assets ratios and financial institution dependence both rose markedly to 1990
and shrank thereafter. And these patterns were reflected in interest burdens as well: Non-operating
profits as a share of total sales grew from a negative 60% in 1985 to 120% in 1990, and then were
pulled back sharply to 30% in 1995.
The data on business services firms turned out to be difficult to interpret.  They show clear signs of
sample instability, especially for the smallest firms. One clue to this, even in the summary data
presented in Appendix A, is the change in importance of land holdings: Land as a percent of fixed
assets was only 4% in the samples for 1980 and 1985, jumped to 12% in 1990 and fell back to 8% in
1995. A few other sectors showed similar jumps back and forth over time, but the overall pattern was
usually for this ratio to be stable or show a consistent trend over time.
In the charts below, it is immediately apparent that data for firms below ¥100 million capital are
subject to more-than-cyclical volatility, very likely reflecting changes in the composition of the
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size measured by employees, among firms between ¥100 million and ¥1 billion, gyrates senselessly
in the 1980s. At least one of these swings (lasting from 1988 Apr-Jun through 1989 Jan-Mar) is
almost surely due to the annual sample change, and most of the financial variables (borrowing, debt,
interest coverage) reflect a sharp swing in that same period for that class of firms.
Changes in total liabilities, as one example, show a ragged pattern that is not very credible. More-
over, some of the changes are dominated by the smallest firms. In particular, the jump in debt levels
reported in Apr-Jun 1991 does not look plausible. Interestingly, the anomalies do not disappear when
the very smallest firms – those between ¥10 million and ¥50 million capital – are taken out of the
reckoning (second chart below). It looks as if changes in membership within the ¥50 to ¥100 million
class were sufficiently large to distort the entire industry sample during that year.
Source: All data in this section on business services firms are from the MoF quarterly survey of corporations; they are
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As another example, the proportion of assets represented by land shows suspicious changes, espe-
cially in the small size class. This item generally tends to be stable, since the measurements are at
book value. The first chart below brings out the frequency with which swings happen in April data,
often persisting for four quarters as would be expected if they are due to sample change. Data for
middle-sized and (especially) large firms look more reasonable.
Since land holding is thought to have been an important influence on the financial situation of firms
during the periods of asset-price change – a hypothesis that goes to the heart of the credit channels
thesis, at least for Japan – these distortions in sampling could obscure the relationships that are
sought in the data. These observations, of course, relate to a single sector, and the problem could
conceivably be specific to, or especially important in, business services firms. Still, these observa-
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Appendix D: Adjustment for sample discontinuities in the MoF survey data
The Ministry of Finance's Quarterly Survey of Corporations takes as its sample a set of firms that are
selected each April from the Tax Bureau's data and other sources, and then used for a period of one year
(four quarters). Ideally, if the sample selection method is appropriate, there should be no discontinuity in
the time series resulting from these sample changes. However, examination of the data clearly reveals that
there are discontinuities around these points of sample change. Consequently, we have attempted an
adjustment for sample change. The adjustment is similar in intent to that of the Institute for Social
Engineering (1976), but different in a number of details.
For stock items such as asset or liability levels, the survey contains figures for both the beginning and end
of each period covered. This means that the end-March level of the old sample can be compared with the
end-March (beginning-April) level of the new sample. For flow items like sales and current profits,
however, there are no overlapping data from the new and old sample that can be directly compared. As a
result, different adjustment methods are adopted for stock data as opposed to flow data, as described
below.
I. Adjustment for discontinuity in stock data
Stock items are recorded with values as of the beginning and end of each quarter. As a result, looking at
the January-March quarter, there is an overlap between the old sample's fourth quarter (fiscal year base –
used throughout this Appendix – i.e., the January-March quarter) and the new sample's first quarter (i.e.,
April-June). The method used is to adjust the old sample's fourth quarter ending level to the new sample's
first quarter starting level. In other words, taking the starting level of each sample year's first quarter as a
fixed point, the ending values for each quarter are distributed between these first-quarter levels. Then,
using the assumption that the rate of stock growth was the same at newly included firms as at previously
included firms, the distribution was made so that the average per-firm increase in the stock (measured as
the ratio to the fourth quarter level) was unchanged throughout the adjustment. More precisely, the
method is as follows:
Define the end-quarter stock level and number of firms for quarter k of fiscal year t as St,k and Nt,k
respectively, and the starting stock level for the first quarter of fiscal year t as S*t . If rt,k is defined as the
growth rate of the average stock per firm, between quarter k of fiscal year t and the fourth quarter of the
same year, then
rt,k = (St,4/Nt,4)/(St,k/Nt,k)
Then, expressing the adjusted quarter-end value for the kth quarter of fiscal year t as S#t,k
S#t,k = (S*t+1–St,4)•(k/4)/rt,k + St,k
II. Adjustment for discontinuity in flow data
Since flow items, unlike the stock data, have no overlapping values between the old and new samples, the
method described in section I cannot be applied directly. The adjustment is done based on an assumption
that the ratio of each flow item to the total stock of capital is fixed, regardless of whether data are adjusted
for discontinuity or not. This is based on the empirical observation that these ratios to total capital are
relatively stable over time. Then, the adjusted flow items are obtained by applying the ratio of adjusted to
unadjusted capital stock for each period, where the capital stock figures have been adjusted using the
method of section I.
